progress.
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How does one begin to understand this issue from a moral perspective? What previously encountered paradigms apply here? 12 What questions need be asked and answered before we decide whether or not to proceed with fetal transplantation? Let us examine some of the paradigms by which various authors have proposed that we may best understand this issue.
1) The situation is most like organ donation by any living donor. The mother is the subject and the fetus is disposable tissue which belongs to her, like a lymph node or a kidney. She is free to donate this tissue if she is inspired to do so.
This position has been articulated by a lawyer on the staff of a bioethics research institute as follows: "Just because a woman decides to have an abortion does not take away her property rights." 13 The Vatican position obviously opposes this conception of the fetus.
14 Mahowald, Silver, and Ratcheson afford the living, nonviable fetus a status somewhat higher than "tissue." Nonetheless, they invoke the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in discussing the case of the living, ex-utero, but previable fetus. The Act allows parents to give "all or part of the body of a dead fetus" for research or therapeutic purposes. These authors do not appear to recognize a moral distinction between a living, previable fetus and a dead fetus. They conclude that it is moral to donate tissue from a living, previable fetus if the consent of the mother is given, the research goal is "significant," and there is no other way to conduct the research.
15 This is essentially a utilitarian argument to allow the use of this tissue because of social benefit. The problems with a utilitarian approach to this type of question have been clearly pointed out by McCormick in the context of his arguments urging caution in the use of fetuses for nontherapeutic research. 16 2) The fetus about to be electively aborted is a condemned but innocent and exceptionally vulnerable human being. No one can claim to give consent for nontherapeutic experiments on children who are in jail or 11 institutionalized without serious risk of abusing the innocent. The living, nonviable fetus is even more vulnerable than a child and should not be experimented upon. This is essentially the position of Paul Ramsey. 17 It would also seem closest to the position of the Vatican document which prohibits nontherapeutic operations or experiments involving live embryos. 18 The greatest barrier to research, which Ramsey sees as insurmountable, is the inability to obtain a valid consent. This will be discussed in more detail below.
3) The living but nonviable aborted fetus is most like a victim of a motorcycle accident who has been unfortunately killed, or even a person who has been unjustly murdered. Why not make the best of a bad situation? At least some good may come of the tragedy if tissue from the victim can be used to sustain or improve another person's life.
One medical scientist has stated the position this way: "If someone has decided to have an abortion and gives permission, it is all right to use that tissue to help someone else." 19 Arthur Caplan agrees, stating that the tissue gift can be a source of solace to the parents of the fetus. 20 Other authors argue that this merely helps to redeem abortion, which they consider an intrinsic evil. 21 One obvious problem with this analogy to the case of cadaveric transplantation is that the living, nonviable fetus is not, by virtue of the fact that it is still living, a cadaver. The analogy only holds when the fetus is dead. Another problem, recognized by Caplan himself, is that of consent for donation of the fetal tissue. We will address this issue in more detail below.
4) The situation is analogous to surrogate parenting. It is morally permissible for the fetus to be nurtured in the womb of a woman who does not intend to rear the child, but who becomes pregnant expressly for the purpose of donating the fetal tissue to someone else.
Mary Ann Warren has taken this stand. "A surgeon ought to agree to a woman's plan to provide her husband with the kidneys of a fetus conceived for that purpose [i.e., transplantation] and aborted at 5 to 6 months." This has been criticized as using the fetus as an "organ farm." 22 It would appear, however, that Warren's conclusion is the logical exten sion of the position held by many that the fetus has no characteristics in common with the community of "persons" to whom one may assign rights, and that it is the right of the woman to dispose of the fetus as she wishes. A California woman has reportedly inquired about the possibility that she might be artificially inseminated with her father's sperm so as to use the tissue from the resultant fetus for transplantation into the brain of her ailing father. 23 In response to such possibilities, Mahowald et al. 24 and Fine 25 have proposed that donors and recipients remain anonymous. They also propose that the sale of fetal tissue be prohibited. Robert White contends, but with no supporting data, that if any form of fetal tissue donation is allowed, commercialization is inevitable.
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Mahowald, Silver, and Ratcheson 27 have noted that the situation is less ethically secure than the case of surrogate motherhood in that the pregnancy produces only a good effect in the case of surrogate mother hood (i.e., the donation of a baby to an infertile couple), while in the case of pregnancy for organ transplant both good effects (the transplant) and bad effects (the demise of the fetus) are produced. One might observe, however, that there is an additional "bad outcome" in all cases of surrogate motherhood, whether for donating tissue or a living child. Behavioral biologists have taught us much about the phenomenon of "bonding" in recent years, especially about the strength of the bonding that occurs in the antenatum and peripartum periods of the maternalchild relationship. If we accept this biology, then a systematic "bad outcome" occurs in every case of surrogate motherhood, i.e. the inten tional creation and destruction of the maternal-child bonding relation ship.
5) The 1975 NIH guidelines regarding fetal research are sufficient moral grounds for deciding whether or not fetal tissue transplantation is justified.
The existing NIH guidelines direct that nontherapeutic research on the living, nonviable fetus can proceed provided that the vital functions are not artificially maintained in order to prolong the dying of the fetus, that no procedures be performed which directly terminate the life of the fetus, and that there are no other means of obtaining the information sought by the research. 28 35 If the fetus is actually dead, even as the result of an illegitimate abortion, the fetus has the moral status of a human cadaver. The moral permissibility of organ donation from a cadaveric source has been previously established. 36 An adult who has been murdered can morally be the source of donated organs. So too can the dead fetus, even if one considers that fetus a victim of murder.
Third, we should follow the "principle of equality" between fetuses going to term and fetuses to be aborted, not allowing either to be treated differently. 37 We do not permit, as Andre Hellegers pointed out, the removal of vital unpaired organs from a living adult donor or from a fetus we intend to bring to term. We should therefore not allow the removal of vital brain tissue (which would be a direct act of killing) from the living, ex-utero fetus even if it is nonviable. 38 This would mean that the present NIH guidelines for fetal research, which are based on this principle of equality and prohibit any direct act of killing the fetus, should be applied to the case of fetal transplantation.
Several problems arise. How does one determine death in the living but nonviable ex-utero fetus? If the amount of fetal tissue obtained is high enough for successful transplantation using standard criteria of fetal death (absence of fetal heartbeat, respiration, umbilical cord pulse, and spontaneous movement 39 ), such criteria will be sufficient. If not, Helle gers pointed out that since brain waves are present in the fetus at eight weeks, the absence of brain waves at 11-12 weeks could be used to establish fetal death. 40 The thorny problem of consent remains. McCormick argues that the "best interests" of one unable to give consent can be construed by proxy to include the charitable act of consent to research. 43 It seems appropriate to apply this communitarian approach here. The difficulty comes, however, in deciding who is the proper proxy. Are the parents who gave consent for the abortion to be understood to represent the "best interests" of the fetus? Mahowald, Silver, and Ratcheson have applied the principle of double effect to the "legitimate" abortion situation and have concluded that the death of the fetus can sometimes be an "unintended" outcome of an abortion performed for other reasons (e.g., the health of the mother).
44 Therefore they tentatively conclude that in certain cases the mother can still be considered capable of deciding in the "best interests" of the fetus she elects to abort. This seems to be a capricious use of the principle of double effect and threatens the integrity of this important principle. A true "double effect" situation presupposes the overlap, but not the identity, of the desired and the undesired outcomes. One must be realistically able to intend one without intending the other. For example, the pain-relieving and the respiratory-depressant effects of morphine overlap, but they are not completely coextensive pharmacologic effects. One may legitimately strive to give pain relief without killing the patient when using morphine, even though the drug may actually hasten death. One cannot electively abort a fetus without intending the abortion of the fetus. The "undesired" outcome is the very means of producing the desired outcome. This is not to say that it is impossible to mount an argument for some form of "legitimate abortion," but rather to suggest that a double-effect argument cannot be used to establish the case. Nor is such an argument sufficient to establish that a woman who seeks an abortion, even with the best of intentions, can be construed to act in the "best interests" of the fetus and give proxy consent for transplantation 41 Finally, it would seem prudent to prohibit compensation for any tissue obtained, 49 to preserve the anonymity of donor and recipient, and to prohibit the surgeon who will perform the transplant from acting as the physician who declares the fetus dead.
50 Under these conditions it seems then that even a cautious moralist could accept a transplant of nerve tissue from a dead fetus, if the parents of a stillborn or spontaneously aborted fetus have given permission or if some disinterested party other than the parents or the state has assumed responsibility for the remains of an electively aborted fetus and has given appropriate consent. 45 
AIDS AND THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF PHYSICIANS
The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a new disease. The first cases of AIDS and the AIDS-related complex (ARC) were reported in 1981. 51 The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) which causes the disease was discovered in 1983. 52 Infection with HIV causes susceptibility to certain cancers and to a host of other infections. HIV infection causes damage to the brain, the peripheral nervous system, the blood cells, the skin, and almost every organ in the body. While some drug therapies appear to be able to slow the progress of the disease, and while most of the infections caused by the immunodeficient state can be successfully treated, the disease itself is currently incurable.
A new and lethal disease like AIDS raises many questions. Given the fact that the major risk factors in the U.S. for contracting AIDS are homosexual intercourse and intravenous drug use, many of the moral questions which surface relate to the morality of these activities and to prevailing social attitudes. In a recent article in this journal, Spohn has comprehensively outlined many of these questions.
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The AIDS epidemic raises, however, another set of questions. Is this epidemic "bringing out the best in medicine" 54 or has it exposed the profession's moral malaise? 55 Journalists have documented the reluctance of many physicians to treat HIV-infected patients. 56 Medical-journal articles report cases of individuals who have refused to provide such care, 57 and have printed letters and articles defending the morality of the decision to refuse to care for HIV-infected patients. 58 In contrast, the American College of Physicians and the American Medical Association have both termed the care of HIV-infected patients a "duty" for physi- cians. 59 The AMA leaves a loophole, however. "Physicians who are unable to provide the services required by AIDS patients should make referrals to those physicians or facilities equipped to provide such services." Moreover, the AMA does not intend to enforce any duty to treat HIVpositive patients.
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Health-care workers who refuse to treat HIV-positive patients often cite personal risk as the reason for their refusal. How great is the risk? While the data are a matter of controversy, it seems that the risk of being infected with the AIDS virus is between 1 in 400 and 1 in 800 per recognized penetrating needle-stick injury. 61 Given the relative infrequency of needle-stick injuries per year for internists, this is approximately the same as the risk of death per year for a Boston fire fighter.
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The risks associated with casual exposure seem negligible. 63 Some critics have attacked this research as "advocate science," charging that such studies begin with a social point of view and are designed to prove that point. 64 Yet multiple investigators have reached the same conclusions regarding the relatively low risk of infection. 65 While the scientific investigation of AIDS may be incomplete, we cannot ignore the information we already have, 66 practitioner as well as to the patient. Was the aphorism primum non nocere ever intended for application to the physician? If we interpret this in a rigidly deontologie fashion, we could never require a physician to accept even minor inconveniences in caring for patients. If we interpret this as a prima-facie rule, then every inconvenience for the physician becomes a matter of dispute, not a moral and professional expectation. If we adopt a utilitarian basis for deciding whether or not to require physicians to accept inconveniences or risks, then we must perform a calculation of the net beneficence to patients and to providers. Left open is the possibility of an argument by a physician that the benefit to self, plus the foreseen benefit he or she expects to provide to family and to future patients, justifies a policy of not accepting the inconveniences or risks of caring for certain patients or types of patients. Do we want the care of individual patients to be directed by this sort of analysis?
Other variations on this theme can be advanced. One might argue that being fearful, or angry, would only compromise the care one would provide for HIV-infected patients and that therefore one should not treat such patients. 72 Pellegrino has also reported that some physicians, who see the doctor-patient relationship in contractual terms, argue that "AIDS wasn't in the contract" when they entered the profession, and that since nature has broken the contract, they see no obligation to treat such patients.
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Interns and residents bear a disproportionate burden of exposure to HIV-infected blood and body fluids. The ethicists, public-health officials, and professors of medicine who champion the duty to treat HIV-infected patients generally do not have a very intense exposure to infected blood and body fluids. This fact has been sensitively pointed out by several authors. 74 While this may be true, young physicians should note that each generation of physicians has taken its oath and has entered the profession open to the future and exposed to risks not encountered by their professors, who were the young physicians of the previous genera tion. The degree of altruism which can be required of physicians. 75 But there is a clear lineage of writers who from antiquity to the present have held that medical practice requires a degree of self-effacement. In the first century A.D., for example, Scribonius Largus, writing about medicine with such strong words as professio, misericordia, humanitas, and sacramentum, clearly argued for a significant degree of self-effacement on the part of the physician. 76 In the 20th century, Abraham Flexner, the great reformer of American medical education, included altruism among the character istics which define a profession. 77 Are these authors correct? And if so, what should be the appropriate response of physicians facing the AIDS epidemic?
The American bishops' statement on AIDS does not seem to allow health-care workers any moral grounds for refusing to care for HIVinfected patients. 78 While the document has stirred controversy among the bishops over other issues, this point has not proven problematic. An editorial in America made an even stronger statement: "To shun an AIDS victim is to shun Christ. Catholic hospitals, hospices, chaplains, doctors, and other personnel have a special responsibility for the care of AIDS victims."
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On becoming a physician, does one take on a special obligation to benefit one's patients "which is greater than the ordinary obligations we all have to benefit one another"? 80 While many have vigorously made this claim, only Pellegrino and Thomasma 81 have delineated reasons which support the notion that altruism is intrinsic to medicine. Their argument is based on three facts about medicine from which they infer that a degree of altruism is obligatory for physicians. First, the vulnera bility of the sick patient necessitates a relationship of trust when a physician offers to put knowledge at the service of the sick. Second, the knowledge of the physician is nonproprietary. Society has offered the bodies of its living to experimentation and the bodies of its dead to dissection. The huge pool of medical knowledge is shared by a global community of practitioners and is an expanding, self-correcting process of learning which belongs to no one physician. Society even financially subsidizes the education of all physicians in this country. Third, all physicians, on entering the profession, take an oath of some sort by which each publicly promises to serve the interests of the sick. On the basis of these facts, Pellegrino and Thomasma infer an obligation of selfeffacement on the part of physicians which requires that they care for HIV-infected patients despite the fact that this entails a degree of personal risk.
If one accepts this proposition that the relationship between doctor and patient is "special" and requires "special" obligations on the part of the doctor, one must still address the question of competing "special" relationships such as the relationship to family. Meilaender 82 has pointed out that while the vulnerability of the patient results in a prima-facie duty to help, this must be tempered by obligations to others and to selfpreservation. Consider, for example, the risks taken on by a pregnant surgeon, who has a high risk of penetrating injury and has special obligations to her family and to her unborn child. What degree of altruism can we expect of her? Emanuel agrees with Meilaender and concludes that obligations to family can override obligations to patients. 83 But where the line can be drawn is unclear.
Is an appeal to the virtue of physicians sufficient? 84 Is it true that every plague "will inevitably produce a two-tiered system of care-giv ers"? 85 Some propose that physicians be required to care for AIDS patients. Others say it is a commendable option which should be chosen by those who are virtuous. Should we, as some have done, sigh with a sense of resignation and quote Gibbon: "The same passions which made these regulations necessary rendered them ineffectual"? 86 Or should we, recognizing Pellegrino's observation that virtue "is always a scarce com modity," conclude that "it is the conception that altruism is non-obliga tory that is erroneous"? 87 
MORALITY AND THE HEALTH-MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
The total U.S. health-care bill is in excess of one billion dollars a day.
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In facing such a staggering figure, the response of economists has been to apply the algorithms of cost-benefit analysis and to say that "treatments must be stopped when marginal benefits equal marginal costs."
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Under such intense economic pressure, both private insurance companies and the government (through Medicaid and Medicare) have introduced cost-saving plans. Among the many means by which private insurers and the government propose to decrease health-care expenditures, their promotion of the health-maintenance organization (HMO) is one that is undergoing significant ethical scrutiny.
By 1987 the number of Americans enrolled in HMOs had reached 27 million. Nearly half were enrolled in for-profit plans. 94 It has been a widely accepted assumption that HMOs would result in decreased medical-care costs, primarily by reducing patient hospitalization and elective surgery. 95 In addition, it has been advocated for some time that by explicitly making medical care a free-enterprise commodity subject to market competition, care would be delivered more efficiently and more inexpensively.
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The milieu in which medicine is practiced has certainly changed in the U.S. in the last several decades. The simple, unilateral doctor-patient relationship has been replaced by a multilateral relationship involving the employers of both the doctor and the patient, the insurers of both the doctor and the patient, the lawyers of both the doctor and the patient, and the federal, state, and local governments. This is especially true in an HMO, where many of these relationships and their sometimes incongruent interests are more explicit. The question of moral concern is whether or not the HMO has brought the interests of the patient and the physician into direct conflict. Primary-care physicians have always been the mode of access for patients to the full range of services available in the health-care system. It is the physician who orders the tests and prescribes the treatments. Pellegrino and Thomasma have called this "de-facto" gatekeeping. 98 The HMO has promoted another variation on gatekeeping, however, which Pellegrino and Thomasma have dubbed "negative gatekeeping" 99 and which has become widely accepted as a matter-of-fact reality for American medical practice. 100 Negative gatekeeping refers to the system of incentives by which a physician is urged to reduce utilization of tests, surgery, specialty referrals, and hospitalization. Negative gatekeeping has the advantage of reducing unnecessary medical interventions with their attendant risks of side effects and financial costs. It has aroused the suspicion of many physicians, however, 101 since it has the potential to promote a conflict of interest in which it is to the physician's personal financial benefit to limit services in delivering care to his or her patients.
The moral questions raised by the HMO have been addressed from several distinct points of view. In the remainder of this paper three of these points of view will be presented, and these points of view will then be critiqued from the viewpoint of the concerned practicing physician. The first point of view is that of the libertarian; the second, that of the politically liberal health-policy analyst; the third, the Marxist perspective. The critique will be based on the views of Pellegrino and Thomasma.
profit. Nor is this itself evil. Medicine is not an endeavor of amateurs nor usually of mendicant friars." 104 The libertarian accepts the fact that medicine today has become "deeply entrepreneurial" and believes that the most pressing ethical issue in health-care economics is the question of whether or not the public is better off when health facilities are owned and operated by physicians or by managers without medical training and expertise. 105 They accept the notion that health care is a commodity for sale on the market 106 and believe that "the profit motive should encourage the retailing of virtue because the market is likely to reward corporations that treat patients as individuals." 107 They do not accept the notion that any more special obligations to care for the poor ought be imposed upon those who retail medical care than the obligations imposed upon those who retail other basic goods like food or shelter. 108 Paying taxes is sufficient social responsibility for proprietary health-care facilities. 109 The practice of "dumping" poor patients from proprietary to nonproprie tary facilities by forced transfer and the practice of "skimming" affluent patients and profitable diagnoses off the top of the patient pool are regarded as virtuous practices because they compel "individuals, com munities, and governments to confront the question of the level of care they wish to provide for the indigent." 110 In the libertarian view the profit motive in medicine is a moral good, and the for-profit HMO morally praiseworthy.
The politically liberal health-policy analyst takes a different perspec tive. The health-policy analyst takes rising health-care costs very seri ously. The HMO, from this perspective, becomes problematic for society simply because it forces us to make the hard choices we would rather not have to make. 111 Even "negative gatekeeping" can be seen in its most positive light, decreasing unnecessary procedures and side effects, stim ulating a rigorous reappraisal of the utility of our health-care technology, and bringing the medical and social-service aspects of health care into conjunction. 112 The philosophical foundation of the HMO is based upon three assumptions of the health-policy analyst: that the HMO can control costs, that the HMO can reduce social barriers to primary care and thus result in earlier diagnoses and better outcomes, and that the "negative gatekeeping" functions of the HMO can be constructed in such a way as to avoid "inappropriate underutilization" of medically indicated serv ices.
113 According to the health-policy analysts, peer review of physician performance, "consumer protection" policies, and physician education will prevent underutilization of medically indicated services in the name of profit.
114 They note that conflicts of interest are not new to physi cians. 115 They argue that "consumer protection" for patients is both necessary and long overdue.
Povar and Moreno go one step further than most health-policy analysts in trying to assure an ethically sound basis for the HMO. They argue, from the perspective of public health, for "an ethic of community" in which the institution and its physicians recognize "an obligation to act as advocates for the community of patients who participate in the program and not only for the individual patient." 116 In their vision a community of patients and physicians gather to form an organization in which all share in both the protection of their health and the distribution of costs, fully informed that this will entail a degree of "negative gate keeping." In this sense the advocacy of the physician has shifted from the interests of the individual patient to the interests of the community of patients. This ethic of community applies only to the nonprofit HMO. "In for-profit contexts, the potentially problematic incentive structure no longer directly preserves the [interests of the community of patients] ..., but satisfies parties whose interests are not the health care mission of the HMO per se. Such parties are outside the community on which we have grounded our claim to justice. genitalia to a real-estate agent. The physical effects of being ill compound this vulnerability. The state of the patient who must trust in the care of a physician is unique, and demands obligations on the part of the physician which are not expected of anyone else in society. Second, medical care is profoundly relational. One speaks of a "doctor-patient relationship," and there is even evidence that this relationship is itself therapeutic. 123 One does not speak of a "butcher-customer relationship" in such terms. The act of healing with its deeply personal meaning is as much a part of health care as the pill the physician prescribes. Third, illness is an endpoint, superseded only by death. Malnutrition and exposure to the elements can cause disease, but disease does not cause famine or housing shortages. This is not a difference of degree of importance among commodities, but is evidence of a qualitative distinction between medical care and a commodity. It is a mistake to equate medical care with merchandise.
Because this is so, Flexner was able to conclude that "medicine, curative and preventive, has indeed no analogy with business The medical profession is supported for a benign, not a selfish, for a protective, not an exploiting purpose."
124 John Paul II has pointed out that it is neither the means of production nor the product but the human being who is the subject of all human labor. 125 Where is this more profoundly true than in the labor of caring for patients?
One may argue that despite such lofty ideals the facts point out to us that physicians have always practiced with mixed motives. Even when not motivated by the desire for financial reward, there have always been and will continue to be some physicians who have been motivated by the desire for prestige or for power. How does the HMO change any of this?
What the for-profit HMO does which is unique is to institutionalize the profit motive and set it systematically in potential conflict with the interests of the patient. In the "fee-for-service" model the health of the individual patient is the stated goal; medical care is the means of achieving that goal; an appeal is made to the physician's altruism; the wages of the physician are determined on the basis of a "just price" established for each encounter; greed and the provision of unnecessary services for the sake of profit are considered deviations from expected behavior and can be punished by social and legal action. In the socialist model (whether it is generalized across a nation or operating within a "medical kibbutz") the stated goals are the health of the group and the just distribution of costs; medicine is the means to those ends; the appeal is to altruism; the physician's wages are determined by negotiation with the group for a "just wage," and self-interested behavior is considered a deviation which is prevented from affecting the goals of the group by its laws and structures. In the for-profit HMO the stated goals are the profit of the owner and the delivery of health care to a group of consumers; the means of achieving those goals are the medical care produced and the wages paid; the appeal is precisely to physician self-interest; unprofitable physician behavior becomes a deviation from expectations, and such deviation can result in lower wages or termination of employment. It is one thing to say that there have always been some immoral physicians. The for-profit HMO model seems to accept that all physicians are selfinterested and that this self-interest can be exploited for corporate profit. On three counts, then, it seems that the for-profit HMOs have introduced morally suspect activities into medical care. They have "depersonalized" the doctor-patient relationship, turning it into a commodity for sale on the market; they have ignored the obligation of health-care providers to care for the poor; and they have created a system of negative gatekeeping which has institutionalized self-interest as a motivating force for physicians, setting this in conflict with the physician's primary duty to assure the best interests of the patient. For similar reasons Relman has argued that physicians should not work in HMO settings where there are financial incentives to limit access to care.
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If the proprietary HMO is morally unacceptable, is either a system of nonprofit HMOs or a national system of socialized medicine an acceptable moral alternative to the fee-for-service system? The answer is probably yes, although one must be aware that these systems also raise their own moral questions. Catholic health-care institutions, whether operating within a capitalist or a socialist society, must "rest uneasy until the poor are served." 127 Some mount an argument for socialized medicine or for nonprofit HMOs as the best means of providing care for the poor based on an "ethic of community." 128 Others argue for such systems based on their perception of an acute need for economic rationing. It does not seem, however, that our wealthy nation is experiencing such economic distress that we meet the criteria for moral rationing which Pellegrino and Thomasma have outlined. 129 The poor can and ought to be served. Yet one must be careful to note what it means to shift from an ethic of caring for individual patients to an ethic of caring for a group of patients. Such an ethical shift must inevitably accompany the move to the nonprofit HMO or to socialized medicine. One must realize that it is extraordinarily difficult to provide simultaneously for the good of the individual patient and also to assure equal access to all. 130 Patients do not "generally expect the physician to be an instrument of social and economic policy."
131 One should also be wary that Marxist approaches, while praiseworthy for their egalitarianism, tend nonetheless to regard health care as a commodity. As John Paul II has noted, both capitalist materialism and dialectical materialism "fail to recognize the primacy of the person over things."
132 Despite these caveats, it seems that nonprofit HMOs or a generalized national system of socialized medicine would be morally preferable to a system of proprietary HMOs. When Jesus sent his disciples forth into the world, he "gave them authority to expel unclean spirits and to cure sickness and disease of every kind" (Mt 10:1). The question we must continually ask ourselves is by whose authority any of us proposes to heal today.
